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The inequality growth during the last quarter century is explained as caused by a 
decreasing labor–labor exchange rate, i.e. devaluation of one’s labor in exchange for other’s 
labor embodied in the commodities affordable for one’s earnings. We show that the 
productivity growth allows employers to compensate workers with always a lower labor 
equivalent, i.e., in a sense increasingly underpay works, maintaining however an impression 
of fair pay due to an increasing purchasing power of earnings. This conclusion is based on 
the OECD 1990–2014 data for G7 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United 
Kingdom and United States) and Denmark (known for the world least inequality). Finally, it 
is shown that the dependence between the degree of inequality and the degree of decline of 
the labor–labor exchange rate is statistically highly significant. 
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The Thomas Piketty’s (2013) book Capital in the 21st century, suggesting a vast overview of 
the history of wealth accumulation and inequality, made inequality a mainstream topic in 
economics. One of the book’s theses is that the historical accumulation of capital enhances 
its contribution to general productivity, particularly due to investments in research and 
development. This implies an increasing role of capital owners and capital managers, 
explaining a disproportional increase in their income, which implies a significant inequality 
growth in recent decades. Thereby the increasing inequality, though morally criticized, is 
indirectly justified economically.  
The fact that the rich are becoming more rich much more rapidly than lower classes 
improve their standing is evidenced for the United States by Paul Krugman: 
Even households at the 95th percentile — that is, households richer than 19 out of 20 
Americans — have seen their real income rise less than 1 percent a year since the 
late 1970’s. But the income of the richest 1 percent has roughly doubled, and the 
income of the top 0.01 percent — people with incomes of more than $5 million in 
2004 — has risen by a factor of 5 (Krugman  2006).  
The dependence between inequality and capital/labor income shares has been extensively 
studied by international organizations and numerous scholars, for instance, see Adler and 
Schmid (2013), Arpaia et al. (2009), Atkinson (2009), Atkinson et al. (2011), Baccaro and 
Pontusson (2015), Checchi and Garcìa-Penalosa (2010), Glyn (2009),  Mulas-Granados and 
Francese (2015), OECD (2008), OECD (2011), ILO (2013), Schlenker and Schmid (2013), 
Stockhammer (2013). These works confirm the impact of changes of capital/labor income 
shares on the inequality growth and recognize the ongoing commodification of labor in the 
sense of Polanyi (1944).  
It should be noted that labor develops parallel to technology. Workers are becoming better 
educated and more advanced technically. They operate complex expensive equipment and 
bear responsibility for its safety. As a result, labor is progressively becoming more efficient. 
The increasing role of skilled labor is reflected in its promotion in terms of `human capital’ 
and `human development’, equalizing its importance to industrial and financial capital. 
Therefore, the increasing capital’s share in gains can hardly be justified even economically. 
Taking into account advances in labor, the increasing capital income looks as attempts to 
minimally pay workers just to guarantee the reproduction of labor, which becomes always 
easier in the background of growing productivity.  
In this study, we focus on `circulation of labor’ by analogy with Marx’ circulation of 
commodities reflected in his formula “Commodities–Money–Commodities”, i.e. `the 
transformation of commodities into money, and the change of the money back again into 
commodities’ (Marx 1867, Ch. 4). We extend this formula to `Labor–Commodities–Money–
Commodities–Labor’, i.e. the transformation of one’s labor into commodities that are paid 
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with money, and spending the money to pay the labor of others embodied in the 
commodities they produce. Skipping the intermediate stages, we focus on the ends of this 
chain of exchanges and speak about the resulting labor–labor exchange. The aggregate 
labor is not exchanged 1–1, because the commodities purchased for one’s earnings embody 
also the capital invested in the production, but this is not important for our consideration. 
Instead, we trace the evolution of the labor–labor exchange with indexing the labor–labor 
exchange rate. The starting points are the following observations.  
Declining labor–labor exchange rate. The car service station charges me with about 40 
EUR per hour worked, whereas the worker receives about 20 EUR per hour, 
meaning that if he decided to repair his car at his own service station he would pay 
twice more compared with his earnings for the same work. In other words, the 
return from his labor in the form of others’ labor is about 50%. Twenty years ago the 
service station has charged the clients with the equivalent of 25 EUR/hour while 
having paid the workers 15 EUR/hour, resulting in the labor return of about 60%. 
This observation prompts the idea of decreasing labor–labor exchange rate.   
 Personal computers give an illuminating example of how productivity growth masks 
the effect described. Thirty years ago a medium salary was hardly sufficient to 
purchase a personal computer. Now four much better PCs are affordable for a 
medium salary, creating an illusion of growing value of own labor. In fact, due to 
technical innovations, the amount of labor embodied in four modern PCs is smaller 
than that in one PC thirty years ago. This means that the labor return from the labor 
rewarded with a medium salary did not increase but decreased, contrary to a 
growing purchase power of a medium salary.  
Manifestation of decreasing labor–labor exchange rate: disproportional growth of 
housing prices. In August 2015, a Norman-French real estate agent told me that 
now the rich purchase the houses of middle class, the middle class purchase 
workers’ houses, and workers, being unable to afford own housing, stay their whole 
lives in rented apartments. And the villas of the rich are purchased almost 
exclusively by superrich foreigners. Or, the houses purchased 40 years ago by 
middle-class families with one earner, now are affordable for middle-class families 
with two earners. The fact that the real estate prices grow disproportionally to 
earnings means that the labor–labor exchange decreases quite rapidly. Indeed, due 
to relatively little automation, the amount of labor embodied in construction 
remains almost invariable. Hence, if the labor–labor exchange rate remained 
constant, the housing prices would rise proportionally to earnings. Therefore, the 
falling purchasing power of earnings with respect to housing indicates at the falling 
labor–labor exchange rate. This phenomenon is not clearly seen in most consumer 
products. Their production is becoming cheaper due to technological advances that 
progressively reduce the amount of labor required, creating an impression of rising 
earnings’ purchasing power, even when the labor–labor exchange rate decreases. 
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The objectives of the study are: (1) operationalizing of the notion of labor–labor exchange 
rate, (2) monitoring its dynamics for G7 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
United Kingdom, United States) and Denmark (known for its lowest inequality) during the 
last quarter century with available statistics, and (3) statistically testing the dependence 
between the degree of inequality in the countries considered and the degree of decline of 
their labor–labor exchange rate. 
Firstly, we show that due to computer-assisted design, automatic lines, and robotics, the 
share of human labor in manufacturing decreases, reducing production costs and improving 
the purchasing power of earnings for most consumer products, although not to the extent 
the productivity grows. Since the amount of human labor in construction remains more or 
less constant, housing prices are used to monitor the labor–labor exchange rate.  
Next, hourly earnings are expressed in housing square meters in the reference year 1990. 
Proportionally to the productivity growth, the model computes `fair’ hourly earnings up to 
2014 that is equivalent to the same quantity of housing square meters. For instance, 
assuming fair (full) pay in 1990, Danish manufacturing workers are `not paid’ for about 
12% of their working time in 2014, whereas the US manufacturing workers are `not paid’ 
for 37% of their working time in 2014, well in agreement with the inequality trends in both 
countries. 
To link the inequality with the decrease in the labor–labor exchange rate, correlation 
analysis is applied. We show that the dependence between the Gini coefficient and the 
percentage of `unpaid’ working time is over 0.83, being statistically highly significant.  
Finally, we explain that high taxation can retain the labor–labor exchange rate in reasonable 
limits and thereby to create preconditions to tackle the inequality growth. 
Section `Inequality growth’ introduces a few inequality measures with which the inequality 
growth is monitored.   
Section `Productivity, earnings, consumer prices and housing prices’ describes the 
interaction of the time series used in further analysis.  
In Section `Labor–labor exchange rate’ the central notion of the paper is operationally 
defined, indexed, and visualized basing on statistics for G7 countries and Denmark. 
Section `Interpreting labor–labor exchange rate in terms of pay’ illustrates how to convert 
the labor–labor exchange rate indices into absolute figures — either in terms of non-paid 
working time, or underpaid earnings.  
Section `Dependence between inequality and labor–labor exchange rate’ provides empirical 
evidence for significant statistical dependence between the degree of inequality and the 
degree of decrease in the labor–labor exchange rate.  
In Section `Conclusions’ the results of the paper are recapitulated and put in the context.  
Section `Appendix: Source data and their visualization’ contains tables with the data used in 




Figures 1–3, visualizing the Appendix’ Tables 4–7, illustrate the growing inequality in the 
G7 countries and Denmark. Figure 1 displays the share of the richest 10% of the population 
in the total national income. It is the lowest in Denmark, increasing from 25% in 1990 to 
27% by 2010, and the highest in the United States, increasing from 39% in 1990 to 47% in 
2014. Most of the curves have definitive growing trends, indicating at a disproportional 
enrichment of this group of top earners.  
Figure 2 illustrates the relative income difference between the richest 10% and the poorest 
10% of the population. Again, this difference is the smallest in Denmark, where the income 
of the richest 10% is retained about five times higher than that of the poorest 10% during 
the years 1990–2014. In the United States this ration is increased from 12.5 to 16.5.  
Figure 3, which is based on data from Tables 6 and 7, combines the curves for the Gini 
coefficients for the distributions of income before and post taxes and transfers. The 
statistical figures are available till 2012, where six countries have very close Gini 
coefficients for the distributions of income before taxes. Different tax and social policy in 
these countries reduce the inequality to different extent. The Gini coefficient is most used to 




Source: Alvaredo et al. The World Wealth and Income Database http://topincomes.g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/  
(10.11.2015) > The Database > Variables: top 10% income share. 
 





Source: OECD.Stat http://stats.oecd.org/ (26.11.2015 )> Social protection and Well-Being > Income distribution and poverty > 
Customize > Selection > Measure: S90/S10 disposable income decile share; Age group: total population; Definition: current 
definition; Methodology: income definition until 2011. 
 





Source: OECD.Stat http://stats.oecd.org/ (26.11.2015) > Social protection and well-being > Income distribution and poverty > 
Customize > Selection > Measure: (a) Gini (market income, before taxes and transfers), (b) Gini (disposable income, post taxes and 
transfers); Age group: total population; Definition: current definition; Methodology: income definition until 2011. 
 
Figure 3: Gini coefficients for market income before taxes and transfers (dashed curves) 





Productivity, earnings, consumer prices and housing prices 
To explain our way of thought, let us consider four curves in Figure 4. They display the 
1990–2014 US indices of housing prices, hourly earnings in manufacturing (standard 
reference for earnings), consumer prices and productivity. The price indices are given for 
current money values, whereas productivity index refers to `constant prices’, reflecting the 
`real’, i.e. inflation-adjusted productivity. These US curves are extracted from the Appendix’ 
Figures 9–12. The curves depict the (OECD.Stat 2015) indices 2010=100% in Tables 8 and 
10–12 converted to 1990 = 100%. This is done by dividing each OECD index by its 1990 
value and multiplying by 100%.  
As one can see, the US hourly earnings and consumer prices increase almost synchronically 
with the factor 1.8, showing that in the last 25 years both the earnings and consumer prices 
have almost doubled. The synchronous growth of both indices means that the hourly 
earning’s purchasing power remains practically the same over the period considered. 
Consequently, the US manufacturing workers’ living standards improved little during the 
last quarter century (if there is any improvement then rather due to wealth accumulation 
than income), which goes in line with Krugman’s remark cited in Introduction.  
The increase in productivity by factor 1.5 in Figure 4 would suggest a commensurable 
increase in earnings’ purchasing power. The fact that no slightest increase in earnings’ 
purchasing power is observed means that the gains from productivity growth are not 
distributed among workers. It looks that the productivity growth is attributed exclusively to 
capital, so that the surplus profit goes exclusively to its owners and managers, aggravating 
income inequality.  
If productivity in construction and in manufacturing were equal, the housing price index in 
Figure 4 would grow more or less synchronically with the more manufacturing-dependent 
consumer price index. In actuality the productivity in construction grows slower than in 
manufacturing, because the share of human labor in construction remains rather constant, 
whereas in manufacturing it decreases due to rapidly developing robotics, automated 
production lines and computer-assisted design. To provide the same capital return in less 








Source: Derived from OECD.Stat http://stats.oecd.org/ (26.11.2015): (1) Productivity > Productivity and ULC – annual, total economy 
> Growth in GDP per capita, productivity and ULC > Customize > Subject: GDP per hour worked, constant prices; Measure: index; 
(2) Labour > Earnings > Hourly earnings (MEI) > Customize > Selection > Subject: manufacturing, index; Time and frequency: 
annual (3) Prices and Purchasing Power Parties > Consumer and Producer Price Indices > Consumer Prices > Consumer price 
indices > Customize > Selection > Subject: (a) consumer prices – housing, (b) consumer prices – housing excluding imputed rent, (c) 
consumer prices – all items; Time and frequency: annual; Measure: index. 
 
Figure 4: United States indices of productivity (solid curve), hourly earnings in 
manufacturing (dashed curve), housing prices (dotted curve) and consumer prices (dash-




Labor–labor exchange rate 
Now we introduce the notion of labor–labor exchange, explaining it with an example. Let us 
assume that in 1990 one worker makes four kettles per hour of work and his colleague — 
four coffee pots. These production units require the same amount of labor and have the 
same retail price. Taking into account capital investments, social security contributions and 
other factors, we assume that the hourly earnings allow the worker, who makes four kettles 
per hour, to purchase two coffee pots, and another worker, who makes four coffee pots per 
hour, to purchase two kettles. In this situation, the labor embodied in four units is 
exchanged for the labor needed for two units. Thus, the labor–labor exchange rate is 2:1, 
which is regarded as a status quo. If the productivity doubles by 2014, that is, each worker 
makes eight units per hour instead of four and the labor–labor exchange rate remains the 
same 2:1, then the real purchasing power of hourly earnings must double as well, i.e. each 
worker’s hourly earnings must suffice to purchase four units produced by his colleague. 
This situation is considered as maintaining the labor–labor exchange status quo, or fair. If in 
2014 each worker can afford for his hourly earnings not four but only three production 
units, the labor–labor exchange turns to be 8:3 = 2.67:1 deteriorating the status quo and 
considered as unfair.   
The labor–labor exchange rate from the above example can be naturally generalized to 
aggregate labor. We operationalize it using aggregate productivity and aggregate prices. 
The idea is that `abstract’ labor units invested in production are remunerated with hourly 
earnings. The latter are used to purchase labor units of others embodied in aggregate 
consumer goods. Productivity in constant prices (= real productivity), hourly earnings and 
consumer prices are statistically monitored with indices of relative changes over time, so 
that we can trace the dynamics of labor–labor exchange rate, referring to productivity and 
purchasing power of earnings without explicitly referring to money values.  
To be more specific, let us come back to Figure 4. As already mentioned, the US productivity 
growth by factor 1.5 suggests a commensurable increase in the purchasing power of hourly 
earnings. The fact that the purchasing power with reference to consumer products does not 
change over 25 years, means that the labor–labor exchange rate (with reference to 
consumer products) decreased by factor 1.5. Generalizing this train of thought, we obtain 
the following index of labor–labor exchange rate (LLER) as a function of time t: 
LLER1990=1(𝑡) =
Hourly earnings in consumer units1990=100(𝑡)
Productivity1990=100(𝑡)
                                   (1) 
The subscripts 1990 = 1 and 1990 = 100 mean that the indices are referred to the status quo 
year 1990, where the index values are 1 or 100%, respectively.  
Let us apply this formula to our example with kettles and coffee pots. Since the hourly 




Hourly earnings in consumer units1990=100(2014) 
Productivity1990=100(2014)
= 200% 
 = 200% .
 




= 1 . 
That is, the labor–labor exchange rate remains as in 1990, maintaining the status quo, and 
the hourly pay in 2014 is considered fair. If in 2014 the purchasing power of the workers’ 
hourly earnings increased from two to only three units instead of four, then we would have 
LLER1990=1(2014) =





= 0.75 .  
 
This means a decrease in the labor–labor exchange rate to 0.75 of its initial 1990 state, or 
devaluation of one’s labor in the labor–labor exchange by 25% . This is regarded as unfair.  
The dynamics of hourly earnings in aggregate (conditional) consumer units can be 
expressed as the following index 




Substituting this expression in (1), we finally obtain the index of labor–labor exchange rate 
with reference to consumer prices:  




     
Productivity1990=100(𝑡)
.         (2) 
This formula is applied to compute the curves in Figure 5 from the data in Tables 8, 10 and 
12. These curves show the development of LLER w.r.t. consumer prices1990=100(𝑡) for the 
G7 countries and Denmark. The trends in the labor–labor exchange rate of the five 
European states in Figure 5 are more favorable than that of the three non-European 
countries. The best situation is inherent in Denmark: in 2013 the labor–labor exchange rate 
returned to its initial 1990 value, with even an increment in 2014. In Italy, United Kingdom 
and France one’s labor has devaluated by 5–8%, whereas in Germany — by 17%.  Japan and 
Canada with their 23% and 24% of labor devaluation, respectively, go next, and the greatest 
decline of the labor–labor exchange rate is observed in the United States, where one’s labor 
has lost 33% of its 1990 value.  
Additionally to consumer units as an embodiment of labor, we refer to housing units 
measured, say, in square meters. Since the share of hand labor in construction remains 
almost invariable over time (strictly speaking, decreases much slower than in 
manufacturing), housing square meters can be regarded as embodiment of a more or less 
constant amount of labor, and construction labor — as a rather reliable reference for the 
labor–labor exchange. By analogy with the derivation of (2), we obtain 
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LLER w.r.t. housing prices1990=100(𝑡) =
Hourly earnings in housing units 1990=100(𝑡)
Productivity1990=100(𝑡)
=  
    
Hourly earnings 1990=100(𝑡)
Housing prices1990=100(𝑡)
     
Productivity1990=100(𝑡)
 .                            (3)
 
Figure 6 displays the labor–labor exchange rate with reference to housing prices for the 
selection of countries and years as in Figure 5. The curves are computed from the data in 
Tables 8, 11 and 12. Here, the trends look less favorable. Even in Denmark, one’s labor is 
devaluated by 12% and in the United States — by 37%. This means that construction units 
with their rather constant share of hand labor highlight a more dramatic violation of the 





Source: Derived from OECD.Stat http://stats.oecd.org/  (26.11.2015): (1) Labour > Earnings > Hourly earnings (MEI) > Customize > 
Selection > Subject: manufacturing, index; Time and frequency: annual (2) Prices and Purchasing Power Parties > Consumer and 
Producer Price Indices > Consumer Prices > Consumer price indices > Customize > Selection > Subject: consumer prices – all 
items; Time and frequency: annual, Measure: index; (3) Productivity > Productivity and ULC – Annual, Total Economy > Growth in 
GDP per capita, productivity and ULC > Customize > Subject: GDP per hour worked, constant prices; Measure: index. 
 







Source: Derived from OECD.Stat http://stats.oecd.org/ (26.11.2015): (1) Labour > Earnings > Hourly earnings (MEI) > Customize > 
Selection > Subject: manufacturing, index; Time and frequency: annual (2) Prices and Purchasing Power Parties > Consumer and 
Producer Price Indices > Consumer Prices > Consumer price indices > Customize > Selection > Subject: (a) Consumer prices – 
housing, (b) Consumer prices – housing excluding imputed rent; Time and frequency: annual; Measure: index; (3) Productivity > 
Productivity and ULC – Annual, Total Economy > Growth in GDP per capita, productivity and ULC > Customize > Subject: GDP per 
hour worked, constant prices; Measure: index. 
 




Interpreting labor–labor exchange rate in terms of pay 
A decreasing labor–labor exchange rate means that an increasing fraction of working time 
is not compensated with the labor of others. This may have a number of causes, for 
instance, increasing employers’ social security contributions, new tax burdens, rising 
energy prices, and, not the least, attributing productivity gains rather to capital with 
rewarding its owners and managers more generously. Anyway, if we separate the labor–
labor exchange from other factors, we can speak of a deficit of reciprocal labor 
compensation measured in working time, which we simply call a `non-paid percentage of 
working time’. As before, the `fair’, i.e., full compensation (100% of working time) is 
associated with the 1990 status quo. 
In our context, the non-paid percentage of working time is the decrease in the labor–labor 
exchange rate expressed in percent. Since we use two types of references for the labor–
labor exchange, we compute the non-paid percentage of working time in two versions 
Non-paid percentage of working time(𝑡) =  {
[1–LLER with reference to consumer prices1990=1(𝑡)]  × 100%
[1–LLER with reference to housing prices1990=1(𝑡)]  × 100%
 
and consider their mean as a `more neutral’ figure. The results for selected years are shown 
in Table 1. Like in Figures 5–6, the most favorable situation with the mean 6% of non-paid 
working time is inherent in Denmark, and the least favorable — in the United States (35%).  
 
Table 1: Non-paid percentage of working time, assuming full pay (100% of working time) in 
1990 
Country Labor–labor exchange reference 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014 
Canada with reference to consumer prices 0 3 11 16 20 24 
 with reference to housing prices 0 -1 2 7 16 18 
France with reference to consumer prices 0 7 9 10 8 8 
 with reference to housing prices 0 14 16 20 22 23 
Germany with reference to consumer prices 0 6 10 15 17 17 
 with reference to housing prices 0 21 26 29 29 28 
Italy with reference to consumer prices 0 9 13 13 7 4 
 with reference to housing prices 0 15 25 25 23 20 
Japan with reference to consumer prices 0 7 13 15 22 23 
 with reference to housing prices 0 13 20 24 29 28 
United Kingdom with reference to consumer prices 0 5 2 1 2 5 
 with reference to housing prices 0 19 24 28 29 30 
United States with reference to consumer prices 0 8 16 24 29 33 
 with reference to housing prices 0 9 20 29 34 37 
Denmark with reference to consumer prices 0 6 5 3 -1 -1 
 with reference to housing prices 0 11 10 10 9 12 
 Source: Author’s computations based on the variables previously defined 
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Another way to illustrate the decreasing labor–labor exchange rate is to compute `fair’ 
hourly earnings, that retain the same labor–labor exchange rate as in the status quo year 
1990, and to compare them with the existing ones.  
For this purpose, we take the 2011 hourly earnings in manufacturing expressed in EUR 
from Table 9, convert the hourly earnings indices 2010 = 100 in Table 8 into indices 1 = 
2011 (by dividing them by their 2011 values), and with this new indices calculate the actual 
hourly earnings. Taking into account the percentage of non-paid working time (for selected 
years they are given in Table 1), we get the fair hourly earnings, that is, with the 1990 status 
quo in the labor–labor exchange. Figures 7–8 visualize both actual and fair hourly earnings 
in two versions, and Table 2 provides the comparison of actual and fair pay in selected 
years. 
Table 2: The actual hourly earnings in manufacturing and fair hourly earnings understood 
as having the same labor–labor exchange rate as in 1990 
Country Pay pattern 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014 
Canada Actual pay 12.35 14.47 15.92 17.88 19.07 20.4 
 Fair pay with reference to consumer prices 12.35 14.96 17.92 21.27 23.93 26.96 
 Fair pay with reference to housing prices 12.35 14.31 16.24 19.26 22.69 24.99 
France Actual pay 9.29 10.67 12.34 14.43 16.36 17.8 
 Fair pay with reference to consumer prices 9.29 11.47 13.55 16 17.76 19.32 
 Fair pay with reference to housing prices 9.29 12.43 14.75 18.04 21.11 23.25 
Germany Actual pay 12.31 15.55 17.53 19.12 20.87 23.18 
 Fair pay with reference to consumer prices 12.31 16.62 19.46 22.57 25.26 27.93 
 Fair pay with reference to housing prices 12.31 19.7 23.62 26.81 29.55 32.3 
Italy Actual pay 7.89 10.17 11.65 13.22 15.41 16.9 
 Fair pay with reference to consumer prices 7.89 11.22 13.32 15.12 16.5 17.7 
 Fair pay with reference to housing prices 7.89 11.9 15.54 17.71 20.01 21.13 
Japan Actual pay 13.07 14.43 15.19 15.76 15.3 15.77 
 Fair pay with reference to consumer prices 13.07 15.52 17.44 18.6 19.58 20.56 
 Fair pay with reference to housing prices 13.07 16.51 18.94 20.6 21.65 21.9 
United Kingdom Actual pay 7.21 9.52 11.78 14.26 16.74 18.04 
 Fair pay with reference to consumer prices 7.21 9.99 12.04 14.46 17.08 19.09 
 Fair pay with reference to housing prices 7.21 11.72 15.59 19.83 23.63 25.8 
United States Actual pay 10.42 11.93 13.86 16.02 18 18.91 
 Fair pay with reference to consumer prices 10.42 12.93 16.42 21.12 25.5 28.25 
 Fair pay with reference to housing prices 10.42 13.13 17.24 22.68 27.18 30.2 
Denmark Actual pay 14.45 17.08 20.75 25.06 29.55 31.68 
 Fair pay with reference to consumer prices 14.45 18.25 21.82 25.76 29.38 31.51 
 Fair pay with reference to housing prices 14.45 19.15 22.97 27.93 32.48 35.91 
 Source: Author’s computations based on the variables previously defined and the 2011 hourly earnings in manufacturing in USD as 
given in (Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor 19.12.2012) International Comparisons of Hourly Compensation 
Costs in Manufacturing, 2011, p. 10, Table 3, last column http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ichcc.pdf; converted with the USD--




   
 
Source: Author’s computations based on the variables previously defined, taking into account the 2011 hourly earnings in 
manufacturing as given in (Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor 19.12.2012) International Comparisons of Hourly 
Compensation Costs in Manufacturing, 2011, p. 10, Table 3, last column http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ichcc.pdf; and the 
USD–EUR rate 0.77220 on 31.12.2011 as given by (OANDA 2015) http://www.oanda.com/currency/converter/. 
 
Figure 7: Actual pay in manufacturing (solid curves) and fair pay (dashed curves) 
understood as having the same labor–labor exchange rate with reference to consumer 








Source: Author’s computations based on the variables previously defined, taking into account the 2011 hourly earnings in 
manufacturing as given in (Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor 19.12.2012) International Comparisons of Hourly 
Compensation Costs in Manufacturing, 2011, p. 10, Table 3, last column http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ichcc.pdf; and the 
USD–EUR rate 0.77220 on 31.12.2011 as given by (OANDA 2015) http://www.oanda.com/currency/converter/. 
 
Figure 8: Actual pay in manufacturing (solid curves) and fair pay (dashed curves) 
understood as having the same labor–labor exchange rate with reference to housing prices 







Dependence between inequality and labor–labor exchange rate  
Finally, we analyze the dependence between inequality and devaluation of one’s labor in 
labor–labor exchange. For this purpose, we compute correlation coefficients between five 
variables, each with eight observations (for eight countries) displayed in Table 3.  
 


















working time in 
2014 w.r.t. 
consumer prices 




working time in 
2014 w.r.t. 
housing prices 
assuming full pay 
in 1990 
Actual Gini market 
income before taxes 1 0.555 0.183 0.021 0.718** 
Actual Gini post 
taxes and transfers 0.555 1 0.347 0.660* 0.831*** 
Growth of general 
productivity in 
1990–2014 0.183 0.347 1 0.497 0.659* 
Non-paid percentage 
of working time in 
2014 w.r.t. consumer 
prices assuming full 
pay in 1990 0.021 0.660* 0.497 1 0.626* 
Non-paid percentage 
of working time in 
2014 w.r.t. housing 
prices assuming full 
pay in 1990 0.718** 0.831*** 0.659* 0.626* 1 
***           PVAL ≤ 0.01 
**  0.01 < PVAL ≤ 0.05 
*   0.05 < PVAL ≤ 0.10 
 
The inequality is represented by two variables: (1) Gini coefficients for market income 
before taxes and transfers and (2) Gini coefficients for disposal income post taxes and 
transfers. They are the latest available figures in Tables 6 and 7. For instance, in case of Italy 
these figures are for 2012, and in case of United Kingdom — for 2010. 
The country factors of productivity growth in 1990–2014 are computed from the data in 
Table 12. They correspond to the curves’ right-hand ends in Figure 13. For instance, for the 
USA this factor is 1.5, and for Denmark 1.35.   
The trends in the labor–labor exchange rate are represented by their devaluation 
coefficients for 2014 assuming 1990 = 1, otherwise interpreted as `Non-paid percentage of 
working time assuming full pay in 1990’. As previously, we consider two references—
consumer prices and housing prices. These both variables are extracted from the last 
column of Table 1. 
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The third column of Table 3 shows that both Gini variables are low correlated with 
productivity growth. This means that though the productivity growth is generally due to 
investments that increase the capital’s share in gains, the productivity alone has a low 
impact on inequality. The inequality is much more dependent on the unfair remuneration of 
labor, as follows from the correlation of the Gini variables with the variables `Non-paid 
percentage of working time’, particularly with the one referring to housing prices, where 
the correlation attains 0.831; see columns 4–5 in Table 3.  
It is noteworthy that the correlation with devaluation of labor is higher for the variable 
`Gini for disposal income post taxes and transfers’. As seen in Figure 3, the reduction of 
income inequality by taxes and transfers differs considerably among the eight countries 
considered. The countries that significantly reduce income inequality also have a more 
favorable labor–labor exchange rate. Indeed, when taxes are high, the hourly earnings post 
taxes have a limited purchasing power, constraining solvent demand. A reduction of labor– 
labor exchange rate would reduce it further with negative consequences for marketing. 
Social security transfers, on the contrary, stimulate demand and thereby sales of products. 
Roughly speaking, high taxes reduce stimuli to increase the capital’s share in gains, even in 
case of investments, leaving little room for constraining real earnings without negatively 
affecting marketing on the one hand, and, on the other hand, generous social support of 
weak population groups from applicable taxes increases solvent demand of the population, 
supporting economic development. High taxation, thereby, contributes to maintaining a fair 
labor–labor exchange and thereby reduces the inequality growth. All of these are well seen 





Notion of labor–labor exchange. To study possible sources of inequality growth, the 
notion of labor–labor exchange rate is introduced. It reflects the returns from one’s 
labor in the form of others’ labor embodied in goods and services affordable for 
one’s earnings. As references, we use the aggregate labor embodied in consumer 
products and in housing. 
General decrease in the labor–labor exchange rate. Using statistical data for the G7 
countries and Denmark, we provide empirical evidence for a general devaluation of 
one’s labor in the labor–labor exchange. This can be explained by increasing capital 
shares in gains, which implies an increasing bias in income distribution in favor of 
capital owners and capital managers.  
Dependence between the degree of inequality and the degree of decline of the labor–
labor exchange rate. Moreover, the dependence between the degree of inequality 
and the degree of labor devaluation is statistically highly significant. Therefore, it is 
not due to chance that the smallest labor devaluation is inherent in Denmark, where 
the inequality is the lowest among the countries considered, and that the greatest 
labor devaluation is inherent in the United States, where the inequality is the 
highest. 
Control over the labor–labor exchange rate with taxes. High taxes, like in Denmark, 
moderate the motivation to increase the capital share in gains, protecting the labor 
share from significant reductions, retaining the labor–labor exchange rate. Such a tax 
policy constrains the inequality growth not only at the expense of top earners. 
Workers earn more, and the applicable taxes enable generous social transfers 
reducing the inequality from the side of weak social groups. A general economic 
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Appendix: Source data and their visualization 
Table 4: The income share of top 10% earners (visualized in Figure 1) 
Years Canada France Germany Italy Japan United Kingdom United States Denmark 
1990 35.54 32.64  29.5 33.7 36.9 38.84 25.1 
1991 36.31 32.44  29.53 32.94 37.65 38.38 24.82 
1992 36.72 32.23 33.4 29.81 32.32 37.64 39.82 24.86 
1993 37.31 32.22  30.19 32.68 38.34 39.48 24.94 
1994 37.48 32.37  30.41 33.14 38.33 39.6 24.59 
1995 37.85 32.41 31.4 30.57 34.02 38.51 40.54 24.58 
1996 38.77 32.04   34.33 39.3 41.16 24.66 
1997 39.78 32.17   34.68 38.94 41.73 24.9 
1998 40.61 32.59 34.71 32.01 35.51 39.47 42.12 25.09 
1999 41.17 33  32.44 36.15 38.97 42.67 25.35 
2000 42.34 33.05  32.94 37.15 38.43 43.11 25.67 
2001  33.09 35.9 33 38.69 39.33 42.23 25.61 
2002  33.03 35.56 33.03 39.65 38.69 42.36 25.54 
2003  33.11 35.18 33.02 40.17 37.75 42.76 25.43 
2004  33.45 35.59 33.08 40.77 39.54 43.64 25.44 
2005  32.89 37.58 33.19 40.56 41.62 44.94 25.66 
2006  32.81 37.58 33.7 40.81 41.99 45.5 25.73 
2007  33.12 38.57 34.12 41.03 42.61 45.67 26.01 
2008  32.6 39.52 34 40.94  45.96 26.17 
2009  31.86  33.87 40.32 41.53 45.47 25.44 
2010  32.29   40.5 38.08 46.35 26.88 
2011  32.52    39.15 46.63  
2012  32.34    39.13 47.76  
2013       47.01  
2014       47.19  
Source: Alvaredo et al. The World Top Incomes Database http://topincomes.g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/ (10.11.2015) > The 





Table 5: Disposal income decile share ratios (visualized in Figure 2) 
Years Canada France Germany Italy Japan United Kingdom United States Denmark 
1990 7.2  5.3   10  4.5 
1991 7.5   6.8     
1992 7.5        
1993 7        
1994 7.1     8.9   
1995 7.2  6 10.9 10.2  12.5 4 
1996 7.6 6.1       
1997 7.9        
1998 8.2        
1999 8.3     9.2   
2000 8.6 6.3 5.9 10.4 11.7 9.9 12.7 4.4 
2001 8.6     9.3   
2002 8.6     9.1   
2003 8.5    10.1 9.2   
2004 8.9  6.6 10.1  8.9   
2005 8.6 6.6    9.1 15.5 4.6 
2006 8.5    10.3 9.7  4.8 
2007 8.5     9.8  5.1 
2008 8.8 6.8 6.7 9.1  10.1 15.1 5 
2009 8.8 6.8 6.7 9.2 10.7 10.2 15.1 4.9 
2010 8.6 7.2 6.7 10.5  10 15.9 5.3 
2011 8.5 7.4 6.9 10.2   16.6 5.3 
2012    11.3   16.5  
Source: OECD.Stat http://stats.oecd.org/ (26.11.2015) > Social protection and Well-Being > Income distribution and poverty > 
Customize > Selection > Measure: S90/S10 disposable income decile share; Age group: total population; Definition: current 






Table 6: Gini coefficients for market income before taxes and transfers (dashed curves in 
Figure 3)  
Years Canada France Germany Italy Japan United Kingdom United States Denmark 
1990 0.403  0.429   0.49  0.396 
1991 0.423   0.402     
1992 0.429        
1993 0.43        
1994 0.432     0.507   
1995 0.43  0.459 0.467 0.403  0.477 0.417 
1996 0.439 0.473       
1997 0.439        
1998 0.446        
1999 0.438     0.506   
2000 0.44 0.49 0.471 0.475 0.432 0.512 0.476 0.416 
2001 0.442     0.503   
2002 0.441     0.499   
2003 0.439    0.443 0.502   
2004 0.443  0.499 0.512  0.5   
2005 0.436 0.485    0.503 0.486 0.416 
2006 0.436    0.462 0.503  0.415 
2007 0.436     0.504  0.414 
2008 0.438 0.483 0.494 0.491  0.508 0.486 0.405 
2009 0.444 0.493 0.493 0.496 0.488 0.519 0.499 0.408 
2010 0.447 0.505 0.492 0.507  0.523 0.499 0.429 
2011 0.438 0.512 0.506 0.502   0.508 0.431 
2012    0.509   0.506  
Source: OECD.Stat http://stats.oecd.org/ (26.11.2015) > Social protection and well-being > Income distribution and poverty > 
Customize > Selection > Measure: Gini (market income, before taxes and transfers); Age group: total population; Definition: current 





Table 7: Gini coefficients for disposable income post taxes and transfers (solid curves in 
Figure 3)  
Years Canada France Germany Italy Japan United Kingdom United States Denmark 
         
1990 0.287  0.256   0.355 0.349 0.226 
1991 0.294   0.279   0.346 0.222 
1992 0.292  0.263    0.352 0.222 
1993 0.286  0.262    0.369 0.223 
1994 0.287  0.268   0.337 0.366 0.216 
1995 0.289  0.266 0.327 0.323  0.361 0.215 
1996 0.297 0.277 0.26    0.363 0.216 
1997 0.301 0.278 0.259    0.364 0.224 
1998 0.307 0.276 0.259    0.357 0.224 
1999 0.307 0.284 0.259   0.34 0.354 0.228 
2000 0.315 0.287 0.264 0.323 0.337 0.352 0.357 0.227 
2001 0.317 0.287 0.27   0.34 0.36  
2002 0.318 0.284 0.28   0.335 0.376  
2003 0.316 0.282 0.282  0.321 0.335 0.374  
2004 0.322 0.283 0.285 0.331  0.331 0.36  
2005 0.317 0.288 0.297   0.335 0.38 0.232 
2006 0.317 0.293 0.29  0.329 0.339 0.384 0.239 
2007 0.318 0.292 0.295   0.341 0.376 0.246 
2008 0.321 0.293 0.287 0.317  0.342 0.378 0.242 
2009 0.32 0.293 0.288 0.315 0.336 0.345 0.379 0.238 
2010 0.319 0.303 0.286 0.321  0.341 0.38 0.252 
2011 0.316 0.309 0.293 0.322   0.389 0.253 
2012    0.326   0.389  
Source: OECD.Stat http://stats.oecd.org/ (26.11.2015) > Social protection and well-being > Income distribution and poverty > 
Customize > Selection > Measure: Gini (disposable income, post taxes and transfers); Age group: total population; Definition: current 
definition; Methodology: income definition until 2011  
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Table 8: Hourly earnings in manufacturing indices 2010 = 100% (visualized in Figures 9–
10) 
Years Canada France Germany Italy Japan United Kingdom United States Denmark 
1990 64.8 56.8 59 51.2 85.4 43.1 57.9 48.9 
1991 69.5 59 62.6 56.2 88.3 46.5 59.8 51.1 
1992 71.9 61.1 65.9 59.3 89.3 49.6 61.3 52.8 
1993 73.6 62.4 69.3 61.8 89.4 51.8 62.8 54.1 
1994 74.9 63.6 71.9 63.7 91.3 54.5 64.7 55.7 
1995 75.9 65.2 74.5 66 94.3 56.9 66.3 57.8 
1996 78.2 66.9 77.1 68 96.6 59.4 68.5 60 
1997 78.7 68.7 78.3 70.6 99.4 61.8 70.6 62.3 
1998 80.3 70.1 79.7 72.5 98.2 64.6 72.3 65.1 
1999 81.4 71.9 81.9 74.1 97.3 67.3 74.4 67.8 
2000 83.5 75.4 84 75.6 99.3 70.4 77 70.2 
2001 83.9 78.7 85.3 77.1 99.2 73 79.3 73.2 
2002 85 81.3 86.8 79.2 98 75.6 82.2 76.1 
2003 88.6 83.5 88.9 81.2 100.5 78.5 84.6 79.3 
2004 91.4 85.7 90.7 83.6 102.2 82.2 86.8 81.8 
2005 93.8 88.2 91.6 85.8 103 85.2 89 84.8 
2006 93.7 90.7 92.4 88.7 104.3 88.5 90.3 87.5 
2007 98.7 93.2 93.6 91.2 103.9 92.1 92.8 91 
2008 100.4 96.2 96.2 94.3 104 94.8 95.4 94.8 
2009 95.3 98.2 97.9 97.3 95.9 95.9 98 97.5 
2010 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
2011 103.2 102.4 102.5 102.4 102.1 101.4 101.7 102.3 
2012 106.1 105 105.5 104.9 101.4 103.2 102.5 104.1 
2013 106.1 107.1 108.1 107.1 101.3 105.7 103.7 105.8 
2014 107 108.8 111.1 109.7 103.1 107.8 105.1 107.2 
Source: OECD.Stat http://stats.oecd.org/ (26.11.2015) > Labour > Earnings > Hourly earnings (MEI) > Customize > Selection > 






Source: Conversion of the OECD.Stat Hourly earnings in manufacturing index 2010 = 100% 
 






Table 9: Hourly earnings in manufacturing in USD and EUR in 2011 (visualized in Figures 
10 with using data in Table 8) 
Country Hourly earnings in manufacturing in 
2011, USD 
Hourly earnings in manufacturing in 
2011, EUR 
Canada 25.48 19.68 
France 21.70 16.76 
Germany 27.70 21.39 
Italy 20.43 15.78 
Japan 20.23 15.62 
United Kingdom 21.98 16.97 
United States 23.70 18.30 
Denmark 39.15 30.23 
Source: (Bureau of Labor Statistics, US Department of Labor 19.12.2012) International Comparisons of Hourly Compensation Costs 
in Manufacturing, 2011, p. 10, Table 3, last column http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ichcc.pdf; the USD–EUR conversion rate 





Source: Conversion of the OECD.Stat Hourly earnings in manufacturing index 2010 = 100% and data from Table ’Hourly earnings in 
manufacturing in EUR in 2011’. 
 









Table 10: Consumer price indices 2010 = 100% (visualized in Figure 11) 
Years Canada France Germany Italy Japan United Kingdom United States Denmark 
1990 67.3 71.2 67.5 55.8 94.5 62.4 59.9 66.1 
1991 71.1 73.5 70.2 59.3 97.6 67.1 62.5 67.7 
1992 72.1 75.2 73.8 62.5 99.3 70 64.3 69.1 
1993 73.5 76.8 77.1 65.3 100.5 71.7 66.2 70 
1994 73.6 78.1 79.1 68 101.2 73.2 68 71.4 
1995 75.2 79.5 80.5 71.6 101.1 75.1 69.9 72.9 
1996 76.4 81.1 81.6 74.4 101.2 77 71.9 74.4 
1997 77.6 82 83.2 75.9 103 78.3 73.6 76 
1998 78.4 82.5 84 77.4 103.7 79.6 74.8 77.4 
1999 79.7 83 84.5 78.7 103.4 80.7 76.4 79.4 
2000 81.9 84.4 85.7 80.7 102.7 81.3 79 81.7 
2001 84 85.8 87.4 83 101.9 82.3 81.2 83.6 
2002 85.9 87.4 88.6 85 101 83.3 82.5 85.6 
2003 88.2 89.3 89.6 87.3 100.7 84.5 84.4 87.4 
2004 89.9 91.2 91 89.2 100.7 85.6 86.6 88.4 
2005 91.9 92.7 92.5 91 100.4 87.3 89.6 90 
2006 93.7 94.3 93.9 92.9 100.7 89.4 92.4 91.7 
2007 95.7 95.7 96.1 94.6 100.7 91.5 95.1 93.3 
2008 98 98.4 98.6 97.7 102.1 94.8 98.7 96.5 
2009 98.3 98.5 98.9 98.5 100.7 96.8 98.4 97.8 
2010 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
2011 102.9 102.1 102.1 102.8 99.7 104.5 103.2 102.8 
2012 104.5 104.1 104.1 105.9 99.7 107.4 105.3 105.2 
2013 105.5 105 105.7 107.2 100 110.2 106.8 106.1 
2014 107.5 105.5 106.7 107.5 102.8 111.8 108.6 106.7 
Source: OECD.Stat http://stats.oecd.org/ (26.11.2015) > Prices and Purchasing Power Parties > Consumer and Producer Price 
Indices > Consumer Prices > Consumer price indices > Customize > Selection > Subject: Consumer prices – all items; Time and 






Source: Conversion of the OECD.Stat Consumer price index 2010 = 100%  
 







Table 11: Housing price indices 2010 = 100% (visualized in Figure 12) 
Years Canada France Germany Italy Japan United Kingdom United States Denmark 
1990 71 59.9 57.7 46 85.5 45.1 56.2 59.8 
1991 73.4 62.9 61.2 48.8 88.2 50.4 58.8 62.2 
1992 74.3 66 67.5 51.6 90.9 54.5 60.8 64.1 
1993 74.9 68.8 74.4 54.9 93.3 57.9 62.6 66 
1994 74.8 70.6 78.4 59 95.4 60.7 64.5 67.8 
1995 75.9 72.5 81.6 62.6 97.3 63.7 66.6 69.2 
1996 75.8 74.3 84.1 66.9 98.7 66.6 68.8 70.4 
1997 75.5 75.4 86.1 70.5 100.2 69.2 70.9 72.3 
1998 75.9 76.9 87.1 73.6 100.8 71.6 73.2 73.8 
1999 76.7 77.9 87.9 75.8 100.7 73.7 75.3 75.7 
2000 78.3 77.3 88.9 77.6 100.9 76.1 77.8 77.8 
2001 80.2 78.1 90.1 79.3 101.1 78.6 80.7 79.9 
2002 81.7 80.2 91.3 81.2 101 80.7 83.7 81.9 
2003 83.8 82.4 92.3 83.5 100.9 82.1 85.7 84 
2004 85.7 84.9 93 85.8 100.7 83.9 88.1 86.3 
2005 87.8 87.9 93.9 87.9 100.6 86.5 90.3 88.3 
2006 90.9 90.9 95 90.1 100.6 88.9 93.5 90.1 
2007 94.6 93.9 96.3 92.4 100.4 92 96.9 92.2 
2008 98.2 96.2 97.6 95 100.6 95.5 99.4 94.5 
2009 99.3 98.3 98.8 98.1 100.4 97.9 100.4 97.3 
2010 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
2011 101.4 101.4 101.3 102 99.8 103.3 101.3 103 
2012 102.5 103.5 102.6 104.3 99.5 105.9 103.5 105.7 
2013 103.3 105.2 104 105.7 99.1 108 105.9 108.1 
2014 105.1 106.8 105.5 105.8 99.1 109.2 108.9 110 
Source: OECD.Stat http://stats.oecd.org/ (26.11.2015) > Prices and Purchasing Power Parties > Consumer and Producer Price 
Indices > Consumer Prices > Consumer price indices > Customize > Selection > Subject: (a) Consumer prices – housing, (b) 






Source: Conversion of the OECD.Stat Housing index 2010 = 100% 
 




Table12: Productivity indices 2010 = 100% (visualized in Figure 13) 
 Years Canada France Germany Italy Japan United Kingdom United States Denmark 
1990 76.7 73.5 72.2 85.7 70.6 67.7 68.2 74.4 
1991 77.3 74.5 74.8 85.7 72.6 69 69.1 76.1 
1992 78.9 76.1 76.6 86.9 73.6 72.3 71.5 77.5 
1993 80.4 77.2 78.1 88.6 75.8 75 71.7 78.6 
1994 82.1 79.1 80.2 92.3 76.6 77 72.4 83.8 
1995 83.1 81.2 81.7 95 78.4 77.9 72.5 85.2 
1996 83 81.8 83.3 95.1 80.1 79.1 74.4 87.3 
1997 85 83.5 85.5 96.9 81.9 80.8 75.5 88 
1998 86.8 85.7 86.5 96.8 82.2 82 77.1 87.9 
1999 88.8 87.1 87.7 97.4 84.7 83.9 79.3 88.8 
2000 91.4 90.4 89.9 100.1 86.7 86.7 81.5 90.9 
2001 92.4 91.4 92.3 100.6 87.9 88.3 83.3 90.6 
2002 93.7 94.4 93.5 99.8 89.7 90.6 85.7 91.3 
2003 94.2 95.3 94.2 99.1 91.1 94.3 88.3 92.9 
2004 94.5 96 95.2 100.1 93.4 96.4 90.6 95.9 
2005 96.7 97.2 96.6 100.7 94.6 97 92.4 97.4 
2006 97.8 100 98.5 100.7 95.2 99.3 93.1 98.6 
2007 97.8 99.9 100 100.6 96.8 100.8 94 98.8 
2008 97.7 99.1 100.2 100 97 101 94.8 97.3 
2009 98.5 98.5 97.6 97.8 96.2 98.5 97.5 95.4 
2010 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
2011 101.4 101.1 102.1 100.5 100 101.2 100.1 99.9 
2012 101.6 101.4 102.6 100.2 100.8 99.8 100.6 100.4 
2013 102.7 103.1 103.3 100.4 102.5 99.7 101.6 100.3 
2014 104.8 103.1 103.6 99.8 102.1 100 102 100.5 
Source: OECD.Stat http://stats.oecd.org/ (26.11.2015) > Productivity > Productivity and ULC – Annual, Total Economy > Growth in 






Source: Conversion of the OECD.Stat Productivity index 2010 = 100%. 
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